Now that the Bush administration has been confirmed for a new four-year term, however, German and American leaders will have to face the fact that the fundamentals shaping the German-American relationship have shifted and that the old "partners in leadership" concept is gone for good.
Theoretical approaches to understanding German policy
There are fundamentally two ways of regarding what drives the US-German (and broader transatlantic) relationship. The first, realism or neorealism, focuses on the strategic relationship as a function of the structure of the international system. The second, which includes liberal-institutional and constructivist approaches, considers the impact of norms and institutions and stresses the domestic factor in the shaping of foreign policy.
The so-called German problem was the central strategic and political question that confronted twentieth-century Europe. The strategic problem concerned the role of German power within the broader European system of balances and the inability of the major European powers to balance and contain the rising power of unified Germany. Two non-European powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, had to enter the European system in order to create equilibrium, one that remained stable during more than 40 years of the Cold War. 4 This problem of power was linked to Germany's late unification and geographical setting in the heart of Europe.
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German unification in 1990 reopened fears of a return of the German problem as a geopolitical challenge resulting from both a new imbalance within the European system and from the assertiveness of a newly sovereign Germany led by a new postwar generation less constrained both by the Nazi legacy and the transatlantic community. However, the decade that followed unification did not confirm these fears. Unified Germany, under the firmly Europeanist leadership of Helmut Kohl, did not seem to follow the expectations of realists who believed that a more fluid international context, combined with an increase in national power, would result in a more nationalist Germany. While Germany began to enhance its military role, it did so within a multilateral context and generally continued the "civilian power" paradigm. 6 The academic consensus on the German problem at the end of the century was that it had been transformed. Constructivist and neoliberal paradigms seemed to carry the day over realism. These approaches reflect the importance of the internal dimension of the German problem, especially the failure of democracy. As Heinrich August Winkler concluded in his study of Germany's path to westernization, "It was not the solution of the question of national unity which stands at the beginning of the road to catastrophe, but the failure to settle the question of freedom." 7 This internal problem has been solved. Germany is a mature and stable democracy. Those favoring this approach would argue that the new German and European political cultures have created a new postmodern approach to international relations in which realism has been superceded by a civilian power approach.
The 1990s, however, represented an interregnum between two eras, which opened with German unification in 1990 and closed on September 11, 2001. The end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany marked a new era and a more fluid international environment. Added to this was the major external shock provided by the 9/11 attacks. 8 In short, both the realist and the neoliberal approaches were at least partially right. The new fluidity in the structure of international power has interacted with the domestic context of foreign policy, opening new options and perspectives for domestic foreign-policy makers at a time when the domestic environment has undergone a transformation in both countries.
In addition, the personalities of the leaders also mattered in the evolution of the transatlantic relationship. When the political environment is flexible
